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Belisarius hit the Goths with a major plot-twist in AD 540. |
Everyone knows that the Western Roman Empire formally ended in AD 476 when Odoacer deposed the boy-emperor Romulus Augustulus. Or was it AD 480, when the exiled Western Emperor Julius Nepos was assassinated? Or was it in AD 486 when the Roman general Syagrius was defeated by Clovis, King of the Franks, and his outpost of Roman rule in northwestern Gaul was absorbed into the Frankish Kingdom?
No matter which date is attached to it, the Western Empire had certainly assumed room temperature by AD 493, even if the Eastern Emperor in Constantinople kept up the fiction that the Ostrogoths under Theodoric the Great ruled Italy and Dalmatia as his viceroys.
But something strange happened about fifty years later in AD 540. A serious effort was made to revive the Western Roman Empire, and if not for the loyalty and devotion of one man, it may have happened.
Regular readers of this blog have seen my frequent posts about war in Italy launched by Justinian beginning in AD 536 (see here, here, here, and here). This war of reconquest was a long, grinding affair which included long sieges of Neapolis (Naples), Rome, Ariminum (Rimini), and Ravenna. The Goths began the war with a significant advantage in both men and morale, only to be methodically worn down by Justinian's Master of Soldiers, Belisarius. By spring of AD 540, Belisarius and his reinforced Roman army had King Vittigis and the remnant of the Gothic forces trapped in Ravenna.
Considering the scale of the reverses the Goths had suffered, they had no confidence left in their poorly-chosen king, and were ready to talk peace. For his part, Justinian was also ready to talk peace. The Persians under Chosroes I had crossed the frontier and had invaded Roman Mesopotamia, penetrating far into the Empire and threatening the cities of Syria. For Justinian, bringing the war in Italy to a rapid close was his top priority. He therefore sent ambassadors to Ravenna to negotiate an armistice which would leave the Goths in control of Italy north of the River Po, thereby forming a buffer state between Roman Italy to the south of the Po and the bellicose Franks.
Feeling cheated of his hard-won victory in Italy, and perhaps not fully comprehending the disaster unfolding in the East, Belisarius greeted the peace overtures from Constantinople with dismay. In the words of Procopius who was an eye-witness to events in Italy:
Belisarius, upon hearing this, was moved with vexation, counting it a great calamity that anyone should prevent him from winning the decisive victory of the whole war, when it was possible to do so with no trouble, and leading Vittigis a captive to Byzantium. So when the envoys returned from Ravenna, he refused absolutely to ratify the agreement by his own signature. [Procopius, History of the Wars, Book VI, Chapter XXIX]
Belisarius's stubbornness perplexed both the Goths and the Roman ambassadors. Even his own officers were unanimous in their opinion that he should forgo the conquest of all of Italy and follow the Emperor's decision to split the country. For their part, the Goths feared a double-cross and would not accept any treaty unless it was ratified by Belisarius.
It was at this moment that a most unexpected thing happened: someone in the Gothic court suggested that they not surrender to Justinian, but to Belisarius instead. At the same time, they would declare Belisarius Emperor and seat him upon the vacant throne of the Western Roman Empire.
Who proposed this audacious plan? Procopius does not say. In Rome the Eternal, I put the idea into the mouth of Aurelius Cassiodorus, largely for dramatic reasons. However, it is possible if not likely that Cassiodorus played a role in this gambit. After all, he was an extremely able man with long experience navigating a dangerous course between the conservative Roman nobility and the sometimes volatile Gothic royal court. He had been Praetorian Prefect under Queen Amalasuntha, King Theodatus, and under Vittigis as well. After AD 538, he drops out of the historical record for about a decade—his official correspondence ceases during this time. His name is not found at all in the histories of Procopius. Given his political prominence, and his stature as an historian in his own right, having completed an extensive history of the Goths in the early 530s, it is certainly strange that Procopius doesn't mention him. Could there have been a bit of professional jealousy or political rivalry at work? After all, for a classicizing historian like Procopius, the greatest insult he could offer someone he disliked was to pretend he didn't exist.
One gets a strong sense when reading Procopius's account of the Gothic offer of the Purple to Belisarius, that the historian is not telling the whole story—that he is purposely holding back some of the key details. This is likely because the topic itself was fraught with peril. If the taint of disloyalty to the emperor was attached to any individual in Procopius's retelling, it could have disastrous consequences for the person thus exposed.
In the case of Belisarius, his legendary loyalty to the emperor and his subsequent behavior tended to immunize him from any charges of treachery. So Procopius has no difficulty describing the part in this affair played by his illustrious benefactor.
When the Goths presented their bold proposal to Belisarius, he pretended to accept. Procopius records Belisarius's true feelings as follows:
Belisarius was quite unwilling to assume the ruling power against the will of the emperor; for he had an extraordinary loathing for the name of tyrant, and furthermore he had, in fact, been bound by the emperor previously with most solemn oaths never during his lifetime to organize a revolution; still, in order to turn the situation before him to the best advantage, he let it appear that he received the proposals of the barbarians gladly. [Procopius, History of the Wars, Book VI, Chapter XXIX]
What happened next? The Goths surrendered and Belisarius took all the necessary oaths, holding back only the oath to receive the imperial power which he said he would do when he was in Ravenna with his army. The Gothic envoys did not think this at all odd, as Procopius relates:
The envoys, thinking that he would never reject the kingship, but that he would strive for it above all other things, made not the least hesitation in urging him to come with them into Ravenna. [Procopius, History of the Wars, Book VI, Chapter XXIX]
Once inside Ravenna, Belisarius put King Vittigis under guard, disbanded the Gothic army, and proceeded to bring in provisions to feed the starving populace. He did not take any action, ceremonial or otherwise, to proclaim his reign. It wasn't long before the Gothic nobles realized that Belisarius had no intention of ruling as emperor or anything other than Justinian's Master of Soldiers. When Belisarius was summoned back to Constantinople and it became clear that he had every intention of following the emperor's command, the Goths were incensed. In a last ditch effort, they called on Belisarius to uphold his promises, as Procopius writes:
These envoys, upon coming before Belisarius, reminded him of the agreement made with them and reproached him as a breaker of promises, calling him a slave by his own choice, and chiding him because, they said, he did not blush at choosing servitude in place of the kingship. [Procopius, History of the Wars, Book VI, Chapter XXX]
Belisarius did not respond as they hoped:
He, contrary to their expectations, refused them outright saying that never, while the emperor Justinian lived, would Belisarius usurp the title of king. [Procopius, History of the Wars, Book VI, Chapter XXX]
Soon after this confrontation, Belisarius left Italy for Constantinople. Shortly thereafter, the Goths named a new king, Totila, who would be the scourge of Italy for the next decade plus.
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19th century woodcut of Belisarius refusing the imperial diadem. |
But questions remain. If Belisarius had accepted the diadem of the Western Roman Empire, what would have happened? Could he have remained on the throne? How would Justinian have reacted? Did Belisarius have the political and administrative acumen to rule successfully? Would he have had the military and diplomatic skill to extend Roman power beyond Italy?
Given how long this post has become, I will explore these questions in a separate post.